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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD SHIELDS, 
.Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 7822 
PETER RAMON, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF· OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF· F:ACTS 
Respondent disagrees with Appellant's statement of 
facts and for that reason· now sets forth the facts which 
he contends are supported by the record. 
The accident here involved occurred in the nighttime, 
during a very heavy fog. (R. 39). Visibility was very 
restricted. In one place Appellant's witness, Dipo, testi-
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fied that visibility was no greater than 25 feet. (R. 30). 
Later he said it would not be possible to see an approach-
ing car at a distance greater than 20 feet under the con-
ditions prevailing at the intersection. at the time of the 
accident, (R. 32) and that safe driving speed at the time 
was not in excess of 5 miles per hour. ( R. 32.) 
It was under these adverse weather conditions that 
Respondent was slowly proceeding northward on State 
Street in the lane next to the double lines dividing oppos-
ing lanes of traffic. Stopping at about the intersection 
of Truman A venue and State Street before making a 
left turn to the West, Respondent observed headlights of 
two cars approaching from the North. He permitted 
them to go by and noticed they were traveling slowly-
no more than 10 miles per hour (R. 39). Looking again 
to the North he saw no other headlights (R. 39). He 
then began making a left turn very slowly-from two to 
five miles per hour. Appellant, just before. impact, was 
traveling along State Street in the lane next to the 
dividing double lines in a southerly direction. Accord-
ing to Appellant's witness, Dipo, Appellant stated to 
the officer, some thirty to forty-five minutes after the 
accident, that he, Appellant, was traveling thirty miles 
per hour just before impact and twenty-five miles per 
hour at impact (R. 35 and 36). Appellant also told the 
officer he did not see Respondent's car until it was "right · 
in front of him" (R. 30 and 31). .Appellant, himself, 
admitted that he was traveling twenty-five miles per 
hour. · 
Respondent saw Appellant's lights approaching very 
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3 
suddenly (R. 45 and 46), just prior to impact. The front 
part of Appellant's vehicle 1nade contact with the right 
rear side of Respondent's car. (R. 27 and 28). From the 
in1pact Respondent's car traveled 67 feet while Appel-
lant's car traveled 12 feet; (R. 34) no skid marks were 
left by either car. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent has no argument with the law and the 
cases cited by Appellant. They state the law in this juris-
diction covering cases to which they apply. Respondent 
disagrees only with the attempt made by Appellant to 
apply them to the case at bar. In none of the cases cited 
by Appellant are there any fact situations similar to the 
one here before the court. In all of these cases visibility 
was unrestricted. In the case before the court in this 
appeal the visibility of both drivers was extremely im-
paired. 
It is settled law that a driver in encountering a fog 
is not bound as a matter of law to stop and wait for the 
fog to lift in order to escape a charge of negligence. 60 
C.J.S. P. 699; Peasley v. White, 152 Atl. 530; 129 Me. 
450. 
The degree of care to be exercised by an automobile 
driver in a fog varies with the conditions of the fog, 
of the roadway and of traffic. In other words, a driver 
must exercise a degree of care consistent with existing 
conditions. 60 C.J.S. P. 697; Cole. v. Wilson, 127 Me. 316; 
143 Atl. 178; Silva v. Waldie, 82 P. (2) 282; 42 N.M. 514. 
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Appellant contends that under the facts of this case 
the court below was required to find respondent guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law. This, in spite of the fact 
that the evidence in support of the judgment and decree 
rendered, was that respondent was traveling very slowly 
and cautiously; that he stopped in preparation for mak-
ing a left hand turn; that he perceived head lights of 
two other cars approaching him at a slow rate of speed; 
that he permitted them to go by, and looking again to the 
North saw no other head lights and thereupon began to 
make a left turn very slowly, and as he was doing so 
appellant's car coming on at a speed of 30 miles an hour 
struck respondent's car in its approximate center and 
knocked it some 67 feet down the road. 
We believe it was clearly witliin the province of the 
court to weigh these facts which were put in evidence 
and which appear as a matter of record' and that the case 
is not one which this court on appeal can say fastens neg-
ligence upon the Respondent as a matter of law. 
We refer the court to 5 Am. Jur. Page 892, wherein 
it is said: 
"725. Impa.ired Visibility.- Generally where 
the driver of an automobile has been injured, or 
his car damaged, in a motor accident where his 
view was obscured by dust, smoke, or atmospheric 
conditions, it is a question for the jury whether 
his conduct constituted contributory negligence, 
unless the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the accident, and the inferences that may be 
drawn therefrom, are not in dispute. Factors to 
be considered in connection with arriving at a de-
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tern1ination of the motorist's contributory negli-
gence are the speed of his automobile extent of 
visibility, control of car, and any oth~r matterR 
explanatory of the proper degree of care and 
caution demanded under the cirmustances." 
See also: 
Schuster r. J olz nson, 145 A 29, 108 Conn. 704; Moffitt 
z-. O.L.D. Foru·a.rd.Zng Co., 73 N.E. (2d) 164; 331 Ill. App. 
278; Caudle v. Zenor, 251 N.W. 69; 217 Iowa 77; Reserve 
Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 191 N.E. 7 45; 128 Ohio St. 519; 
Langill v. First Nat. Stores, 11 N.E. (2d) 593; 298 Mass. 
559; Cummins v. Southern Fruit Co., 36 S.E. (2d) 11; 
225 N.C. 625; Pope v. Clary, Tex Civ. App. 161 S.W. (2d) 
828. 
In the above case of Moffitt v. O.L.D. Forwarding 
Co. the court had this to say: 
"The question of contributory negligence is 
preeminently for the consideration of the jury, as 
such negligence cannot be defined in exact terms, 
and unless it can be said that the action of the 
injured person is clearly and palpably negligent 
it is not -within the province of the Court to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the jury." 
Of interest on this point are the cases appearing in 37 
A.L.R. 584, et seq, and 73 A.L.R. 1027 et seq. In the 
,cases annotated in the foregoing citations the various 
courts held that the question of contributory negligence 
under the facts of the respective cases there appearing 
was a matter for the trier of the fact to decide and would 
not be disturbed on appeal. 
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In the case of .Alitz v. Minnea.polis & St. L. R. Co., 
196 Iowa, 437, 193 N.W. 423, an automobile driver was 
struck and injured by a train at a crossing in which visi-
bility was obstructed by smoke and fog. From a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff, defendant appealed and 
argued that under the facts of the case plaintiff was 
chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. The court there said: 
"The question thus presented is not to be 
answered or determined from the simple fact of 
the collision, divorced or separated from its atten-
dant circumstances. If, for instance, the jury 
should believe from the evidence, as it was ·autho-
rized to find, that the smoke did obscure plain-
tiff's view of the track, and that such obscurity 
was accentuated by cloudy, misty, or foggy 
weather, and that the approaching train was being 
operated through this screen at a high rate of 
speed, without sounding the proper crossing sig-
nals, then a finding by the jury that plaintiff's 
act in attempting the crossing was consistent with 
reasonable care on his part could not be set aside 
as having no support in the record. Such conclu-
sion is not at all inconsistent with the precedents 
cited by appellant, where the simple fact of the 
presence of smoke or stea:m obscures the travel-
er's vision has been held insufficient to excuse a 
rash attempt to make a crossing." 
In the case of Queen vs. Washington W a.t.er Power 
Co., 128 Wash. 553; 223 Pac. 1045, plaintiff's car was 
damaged when struck by a street car at a crossing and 
plaintiff's vision was reduced to 20 feet by a severe snow 
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stor1n. lT nder such facts the court held that it was a 
question for the jury \vhether the plaintiff had acted as 
a prudent person under the cirmustances and he could 
not be held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of la\v. See also Devoto v. United Auto Transp. 
Co., 223 Par. 1050, 128 \Vash. 604. 
It is submitted by Respondent that the question of 
contributory negligence under the law and facts of this 
case 'vas a question for the trier of the fact, which ques-
tion was resolved in favor of the respondent and against 
the appellant; that the judgment in this case is fully sus-
tained by the record and may not be disturbed in this 
l R..-...~ lJ; - ,A /1t• II•, t G- .,,"Jt, 0 f IV-., I;, c .. c. e... appea. ~A 1... 
"" • .... ,.., 4 t't .. .,.. - + Cil.. uJ 
Appellant makes no argument in support of his con-
tention that he is entitled to judgment. We make brief 
reference to this matter, however, in order to leave no 
doubt as to our position with respect to it. 
We believe that appellant was guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law under the case of NikoZ.eropoulos v. 
Ramsey, 214 P. 304; 61 Utah 465, which states the law in 
this jurisdiction to be that it is negligence for a person 
to drive an automobile on a public street at such a rate 
of speed that it cannot be stopped within the distance at 
which the operator is able to see objects on the street 
in front of him. Officer Dipo, Appellant's own witness, 
testified that visibility was restricted to between 20 to 25 
feet and that safe driving speed was 5 mils per hour. 
Appellant admitted he was traveling 25 miles per hour 
just prior to impact and according to Dipo, Appellant 
admitted to him on the scene that he was traveling 30 
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miles per hour. Neither automobile left skid marks 
because neither party was able to see the other until just 
immediately before impact when it was too late. 
A reading of the whole record will make it clear to 
this Court, as it was clear to_ the Court below that this 
accident happened as a result of Appellant traveling at 
a grossly negligent rate of speed in a dense fog; that 
although Respondent was traveling slowly and cau-
tiously as the circumstances required, he was helpless 
when Appellant suddenly appeared out of the fog coming 
at a high rate of speed; and that Appellant was unable 
to avoid the collision because unable to stop within the 
range of his vision. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit that the judgment of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County is fully sustained by 
the record and should therefore be affirmed with costs 
to Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILFORD W. KIRTON, JR., 
ALBERT R. BOWEN, 
Attorneys for R·espondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
